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(Resumen) 
La supuesta invulnerabilidad del dólar - que quizás nunca ha sido mas fuerte que ahora - no se 
debería dar por seguro. Varios factores, tanto cíclicos como contextúales, han sido responsables 
por la apreciación del dólar durante los últimos años. Pero cada uno de ellos - de naturaleza 
temporal y cambiante, en el mejor de los casos - podría empezar a influir a la moneda 
estadounidense en el sentido contrario. No es una sorpresa, entonces, que se ha convertido en 
una táctica a corto plazo muy atractiva para la élite política y financiera de los EEUU lo de 
seguir con su política tradicional de 'negligencia benigna', cara al tipo de cambio, 
especialmente cuando el dólar está muy fuerte y, de hecho, significativamente sobrevalorado. 
La idea de la 'invulnerabilidad' del dólar ya es sinónima con la defensa de la expansión 
económica más larga de la historia de los EEUU, el cuidado de los niveles altísimas de las 
Bolsa de Nueva York y del Nasdaq, y el mantenimiento del 'mito del mercado' de que las 
economías europeas estén estranguladas por una sobreregulación desbordante y padecen de una 
disfuncionalidad patológica. Al fin y al cabo, el dólar fuerte ha llegado a significar la 
'superioridad indiscutible' del llamado 'modelo Norteamericano' - una versión del capitalismo 
laissez-faire sin apenas ninguna auto-restricción - mientras que el euro representa la posibilidad 
de sostener alguna versión del estado de bienestar, aunque tendrá que reformarse para 
sobrevivir frente a las nuevas dinámicas competitivas producidas por el fenómeno de la 
globalización. 
1. THE MYTH OF DOLLAR INVULNERABILITY 
The dollar has long been considered the world's 'safe-haven' and 'vehicle' currency, 
dominating intemational trade and finance since World War II, and lending American 
policymakers and investors enormous leverage - and therefore privilege and power - over the 
rest of the world. Yet the perceived invulnerability of the dollar - which has perhaps never been 
stronger than it is now - should not be taken for granted. Twice it has fallen from its seemingly 
unconquerable high ground: once in the 1970s and again in the late 1980$. 
After two decades as the pillar of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime, the dollar 
was driven into steep decline by the loóse fiscal policies of the Vietnam years, the 
accommodating monetary policies of the oil shock recessions, and the double-digit inflation 
rates that appeared at the end of the decade. In fact, the dollar reached a low of $1.70 against a 
basket of currencies now constituting the euro. Since then, on only one other occasion has the 
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doUar been as vulnerable - that is too say, as overvalued - as it is now (with a current $/€ 
exchange of $0.88). That was in the mid-1980s, when doilarpeaked against tlie 'synthetic' euro 
at $0.69 in February 1985, before beginning its long slide to the early September 1992 tough of 
$1.55.' 
The appreciation of the dollar in the first half of the 1980s - the last time the dollar 
took on an air of invincible strength - was stimulated by a classic combination of tight 
monetary and loóse fiscal policies. The former created the deep recession of 1980-82 while the 
latter sparked the sharp recovery which is still remembered as the hallmark of the Reagan years. 
During Reagan's first term (1980-84), the US economy began to attract foreign investment on 
the strength of the high interest rates that such a macroeconomic policy combination expectedly 
produced. The principal attraction for inward investment, however, quickly became the strong 
momentum of a rising dollar and the closely related stock market boom, as opposed to simply 
higher interest rates, which naturally subsided as large quantities of capital poured into US 
markets, pushing the currency still higher into a bubble-type overshoot. Meanwhile the current 
account déficit, driven by a vigorously widening trade déficit, continued to grow as the 
strengthening dollar made imports increasingly cheap. This, in tum, helped keep inflation low 
and Wall Street frothy, making the US economy doubly attractive to foreign investors. 
Attempts to coordinate a gradual decline of the dollar were undertaken half-heartedly, 
as American officials were loathe break the 'spell' of the dollar. Nevertheless, more and more 
US manufacturers clamored for a cheaper dollar, while European and Japanese monetary 
diplomáis found themselves in a parody reversal of the Americans' 'benign neglect' during the 
late 1960s Bretton Woods drama. Faith in the dollar continued to sweep everything before it, 
until finally the Plaza Agreement interventions became too much for the markets to bear.' 
These coordinated interventions, designed to gradually weaken the dollar, eventually made their 
1. These figures come from Paul Chertkow, head of global currency research at Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi in London, quoted in the Financial Times, May 4, 2000, p. 29, and from Datastream 
Online Services. This longer view of the dollar-euro exchange rate should place into clearer 
perspective the sensationalist claim that the euro has reached an 'all-time low' every time it dips 
a bit further below $0.90/€. See, for example, more recently, "Euro hits record low against 
dollar" in the FT, Friday September 1, 2000, p. 29. Although such a claim wields significant 
psychological impact over the fickle currency markets and amid the sturm und drang debates 
among financial 'analysts', it is baseless superstition. At least one school of thought would 
argüe that this is the very life source of high finance. 
2. The famous meeting at the Plaza Hotel to coordinate plans for exchange rate intervention to 
correct for the dollar overshoot took place on September 22, 1985, fifteen years to the day 
before the most recent coordinated intervention aimed at corrected for excessive dollar strength 
against the euro on September 22, 2000. During the 17 months subsequent to the Plaza 
agreements, the dollar depreciated some 60%. 
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imprint upon market consciousness, but then destabilizing speculation set in, the dollar 
plummeted, and the stock market crashed in October of 1987. 
Strangely enough, the rise and fall of the dollar during the 1980s is not typically 
referred to as a potential dress rehearsal for the current evolution of the dollar's exchange rate. 
One reason for the reticence among analysts to see a parallel with the 1980s is the fact that the 
macroeconomic policy mix initially responsible for the overshooting dollar in the 1980s was the 
mirror opposite of that which has accompanied the dollar's rise in the late 1990s. While the 
dollar had the interest rate support of the 'Volcker-Reagan' recipe (tight monetary and loóse 
fiscal policy) in the early 1980$, the dollar has strengthened in the late 1990s against the 
backdrop of the 'Greenspan-Clinton' formula (looser monetary and tighter fiscal policy) . 
Strictly speaking, the standard economic interpretation would expect such a policy mix to have 
a weakening effect, if any, on the dollar, particularly given the increasingly large current 
account déficit and the growing amount of extemal liabilities. Many would argüe, however, that 
the fiscal house-cleaning achieved by the Clinton Administration's budget policies has purged 
the US economy of its former maladies and dispelled any doubts lingering from the late 1980s, 
and thereby effectively vaccinated the dollar against major imbalances that could precipitate a 
serious depreciation. 
The current account déficit - having surpassed the 1987 level (3.7% of GDP at the 
time of the 'twin crashes' of dollar and the stock market) - has now crossed over into the 
danger zone and stands at some 4.1% of GDP. However, the govemment budget is now in 
surplus, in stark contrast to the gaping déficit of the mid-1980s, which was well over 3% of the 
US GDP and partially responsible for the dollar's slide from its 1985 peak. The so-called 
Lawson doctrine might be invoked to defend the above argument that while the US extemal 
déficit has reached all-time highs, it is still sustainable given the fact that it is not being driven 
by public sector déficit spending.' A deeper appraisal of the 'fundamentáis', then, might find 
that the dollar is not as vulnerable as it was in 1987. This relatively benign state of affairs -
3. See the discussion on the dollar and exchange rate politics during the 1980s in Joan Spero, 
The Politics of International Economic Relations, Routledge Press, 1997. Of course, this would 
be the last time that US officials would cooperate with the Europeans on exchange market 
intervention. 
4. While the former would restrict money supply while augmenting demand, and thereby 
placing pressure on the pnce of money, the latter would augment money supply and restrict its 
demand, thereby depressing the pnce of money and discouraging net inward flows of 
investment on the capital account. 
5. The Lawson Doctrine was actually formulated with reference to the US's "twin déficits" 
during the 1980's dollar overshoot. While the U.S. might currently meet the Lawson Doctrine's 
criteria as originally proposed (see The Economista December 16, 1995, p. 91), given that it 
does not have a public sector déficit, it might have troubled meeting some of the addendums 
that have been added in the wake of the "tequila" and subsequent emerging market crises of the 
1990s. Nevertheless, given the dollar safe haven status, it is difficult to apply the amended 
doctrine with much certainty to the case of the US. 
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combined whh the emerging market crises (which bolstered the dollar's safe haven status), and 
the TMT stock market boom (which has underpinned Wall Street's most recent buU market) -
has created an even more attractive environment for intemational capital than the sky-high 
Volcker interest rates and bulging Reagan budget déficits of the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, the dollar's very strength could ultimately prove its crucial weakness. 
David Bloom, strategist at HSBC in London, claims there are signs that the currency markets 
are finally beginning to pay more attention to déficits - a bad omen for the still 'almighty' 
doUar. "Although the US déficit is not too alarming in terms of GDP, at about 4%, it is very 
large in absolute terms and will at some point pulí the dollar lower."* 
The dollar's current vulnerability becomes clear, however, when we analyze the 
monetary and financial phenomena that have traditionally underpinned dollar strength, and 
which have worked to neutralize the weakening impact which traditional exchange rate models 
would expect from the current Greenspan-Clinton policy mix. These other contextual factors 
have been particularly influential in the dollar's late 1990s appreciation. Significantly, however, 
each of these factors - which are temporary at best - could suddenly begin to work on the 
exchange rate in reverse, generating a self-reinforcing appreciation of the Euro. 
1.1. International financial crises 
Such crises tend to send money flooding into the US seeking shelter from the storm of 
currency runs elsewhere. This happened during the Third World debt crisis in the early 1980s 
and again in 1995 (the Mexican peso crisis) and 1997-99 (the emerging markets crisis). 
Interestingly enough, the dollar temporarily sagged following the Russian crisis of summer-fall 
1998, as intemational capital temporarily perceived the US economy itself as vulnerable to 
speculative runs, given the heavy exposure of some important US hedge funds and banks in 
Russia. At the same time, the incipient Euro zone seemed to offer a liquid safe haven altemative 
to the dollar. Indeed, during the autumn of 1998, the pre-Euro synthetic equivalent appreciated 
significantly against the dollar (from $ 1.10 to over $ 1.20). 
The healthy US govemment budget position was nevertheless a key factor in 
subsequently allaying the fears of investors, (particularly obsessive about budget déficits) of a 
dollar coUapse. When the Federal Reserve aggressively loosened monetary policy (cutting 
interest rates three times in rapid succession), tight credit conditions - which were threatening 
to toughen and choke off the expansión - relaxed, investor confidence refumed, and the dollar 
regained its lost ground against the newly-bom Euro, explaining much of the single currency's 
'decline' during its first year of life. Another crisis, which catches important US banks or hedge 
funds overexposed, could easily trigger a new dollar slide, particularly if monetary and fiscal 
policy are loosened signifícantly in response.' 
6. Financial Times, Thursday, August 24, 2000, p. 23. 
7. Already the markets are beginning to expect a loosening in US fiscal policy as the new 
administration (whether under Gore or Bush) would likely attempt to 'use' some of the 
accumulating budget surplus. 
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1.2. Business cycle divergences 
The US economy is traditionally at a later stage in the business cycle than the 
European economy. This tends to créate rather volatile growth and interest rata differentials. 
When the US economy heads into a downturn, as it did in late 1979 and again in 1989, the 
dollar displays a conspicuous lack of strength against European currencies (1979-80 and 1989-
90), as European economies are still relatively strong. At such times, the US-EU growth rate 
differential declines because the economies of Europe tend to follow the US in the cycle and 
move into recession later. When the US recovery comes, however, as it did in 1982-83 and 
1993-94, European economies are either still in recession, or are only sluggishly pulling 
themselves up. The relatively fast growth rates of the US, vis-á-vis Europe make the US 
economy appear particularly strong, widening the trans-Atlantic growth rate and interest rate 
differentials attracting investment to the US, and pulling up the dollar. The implication is that 
the next US economic slowdown and the long-forecast slide in the dollar/euro exchange rate 
(not to mentioned the long-feared stock market correction) will be inextricably bound together.* 
European growth rates have recently begun to catch up with those in the US. 
Germany's GDP growth rate in 2Q00, for example was an annualised 4.7%, not far behind the 
US's 5.3% (recently revised upwards to 5.6%), and actually higher if one takes into account 
slower population growth in Germany and its more conservative techniques for measuring 
investment in Information technology.' Nevertheless, the Euro's recent weakness against the 
dollar, it has been repeatedly noted, has stubbomly resisted steady improvements in the Euro 
zone's growth prospects. This has been principally attributed to even better continued growth 
prospects in the US, in tum reflecting a faster growth rate in productivity as a result of a more 
profound Internet transformation in the US. However, given Europe's potential to use UMTS 
mobile technology and leverage upon its higher mobile penetration rates, it could rapidly catch 
up with the US in terms of Intemet's impact on the economy. During this 'catch up' process, 
Europe is likely to tum recent growth differentials on their heads. 
Combined with further evidence of a slowdown in the US (expected to be confirmed 
with the first reléase of 3Q00 GDP figures in late October), continued European growth over 
the next year or two would be enough to push the dollar down and pulí the Euro up. 
8. While stock markets are particularly jittery during the month of October for superstitious 
historical reasons, this October - just before the US presidential elections on 7 November ~ the 
consensus of informed opinión expects the first reléase of the 3Q00 GDP growth figure for the 
US to be substantially below the peak performance in 2Q00 of 5.3%). This would be yet a 
further sign that the long awaited slowdown in the US economy had fínally arrived. Meanwhile, 
it is still not clear that Europe's economy will cióse the growth differential gap; much will 
depend on the current oil price scare and its effect on consumer confidence over the next few 
months in Europe where the economy is more vulnerable to an oil supply shock than the US. 
9. See "Oíd world, new economy" in The Economist, September 1, 2000. 
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1.3. Structural transformations and general policy shifts 
A number of changas have transformed the world's financial markets and given the 
dollar an advantage - if only temporary - against European currencies. Such changes include: 
(I) the shift from a 'current account' financial world to a 'capital account' financial world; (2) 
the displacement of bond markets by stock markets as a central influence on currency 
movements; (3) the displacement of the DJl by the Nasdaq as the principal 'dollar mover'; and 
(4) the increased level of prívate - as opposed to public - indebtedness in the US. 
In 1973, when the dollar cut itself free from the goid-based trunk of the Bretton Woods 
'variable peg' exchange rate regime, and began to float freely on world currency markets, the 
world's intemational transactions still took place predominantly on the current account, and 
currencies movements, by and large, were still largely linked to trade balances. The freeing of 
capital movements and the explosión of the bond markets in the 1980s, particulariy in the US, 
gave the capital account increasing relative influence on the balance of payments and, therefore, 
upon the evolution of a currency's extemal valué. 
But the transformation of intemational finance from a current account-dominated 
world to a capital-account dominated world is only part of the story. In the 1990s, equity 
markets began to displace the bond markets as the principal influence on currency valúes within 
the increasingly influential capital markets. Likewise, the shift from loóse fiscal and tight 
monetary policies to tight fiscal and loóse monetary policies has meant that the bond markets 
have become relatively dry as the supply of govemment debt has been curtailed, and money as 
a result has flooded inte equities. With the increasingly open and globalized nature of the 
capital markets - as more and more countries have liberalized their capital accounts in the 
1990s, and as emerging market stock exchanges established themselves as a favored altemative 
destination for more adventurous money - the dollar became increasingly linked to the relative 
performance of the Dow Jones.'" 
Nevertheless, with the emergence of the Internet, the DJI has parted ways with the 
TMT-driven Nasdaq, and the latter has now overtaken the former as the markets' central 
reference. The dollar/euro exchange rate, in tum, has increasingly become a derivative of the 
relative performance of the Nasdaq against European bourses (which are much heavier in TMT 
weightings than the DJI). As Michael Lewis, sénior economist at Deutsche Bank in London has 
claimed, "The correlation between the dollar and the Nasdaq has not always been particulariy 
strong; but...the Nasdaq is seen by many as a proxy for risk aversión and demand for the 
dollar..."" The TMT boom that has propelled the US equity markets in 1999 and 2000 has 
preceded and, to a certain extent, led the corresponding tech booms in Europe. As a result, the 
10. See the Economist reference ("Test-driving a new model", The Economist, March 18, 2000, 
p. 81) to the study of Cameron Crise, an analyst at Warburg Dillon Read, linking currency 
exchange rates to equity risk premiums. 
11. Financial Times, June 1, 2000, p.27. 
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dollar has strengthened as perceptions still favor the US stock markets over European bourses.'^ 
Recently, however, European stock markets have begun to outperform, suggesting that the Euro 
will be stronger over the médium term. % at the underlying level (having risen only two-tenths 
of a percentage point since the 1.1 % level 
None of this should really come as a surprise. Indeed, the current strength of the dollar, 
while more intense and enduring than most analysts and observers had expected, could easily be 
transformad into relative weakness the moment any of a number of short-term cyclical factors 
change their tendencies. This would likely come as soon as the trans-Atlantic growth rate 
differential narrows - as they are soon likely to do - or when a series of US economic data 
releases surprise the consensus negatively (increasingly likely at this stage of the US longest 
expansión in history). 
Over the médium term, when the cumbersome weight of the U.S. current account 
déficit should begin to make itself felt, and when the euro various advantages and strengths 
begin to emerge (eg, when the new euro notes and coins begin circulating, bringing the 
advantages home to the average EU citizen who travels to her neighboring country, reinforcing 
a sense of European identity and infusing renewed confidence and enthusiasm in the European 
project), the last lingering suspicions that the EU's currency experiment might not be 
permanent will vanish, and with them the alibis of the most radical of the 'Euro bears'. And as 
the EU continúes to introduce further structural reforms in the product and labor markets -
which even the Bundesbank has recently acknowledge having been occurring in Europe at a 
faster rate in recent years), the dollar is bound to weaken against the euro. The very fact that 
European markets are currently still have room for further reform may provide Europe's 
economies with more ampie scope to grow relatively faster over the médium term than the US 
economy, simply by catching up - even if reforms do not ultimately make Europe as laissez 
12. The penultimate slide of the euro's exchange rate (during the week of April 24, 2000) was 
ironically provoked by negative sentiment arising from many of the die-hard euro bulls as the 
currency failed to rebound in the wake of the Nasdaq correction in the US. It should obvious, 
however, that if European bourses are heavily weighted with TMT stocks, they will merely 
follow the Nasdaq when TMTs experience a correction. It will only be when the US economy 
(or stock market) as a whole goes through a correction in investor perceptions vis-á-vis their 
perceptions of European prospects, that the euro will respond by appreciating against the dollar. 
This naturally will not happen until US economic figures stop surprising the investment 
community positively and begin to undershoot consensus forecasts (ie, surprise negatively) 
Most analysts do not expect this until the final quarter of this year. Indeed, a growing consensus 
of opinión now sees the first significant slowdown signs coming with the end of October 
reléase of 3Q00 GDP growth data in the US. The only uncertainty remaining surrounds the 
fiíture of European growth rates which may have actually peaked in 2Q00. That, of course, 
remains to be seen. 
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faire as the US. The process of technological catch-up, in which Europe begins to build its 'new 
economy', should only contribute to the process of exchange rate realignment.' 
It is - as with so many other phenomenon forecast on the basis of fundamental analysis 
- only a matter of time. Once a sea change has occurred in the relative externa! valúes of the 
West's two principal currencies, the chances that more public and private economic 
protagonists around the world will pay more serious attention to the euro wili undoubtedly 
increase. The oft-mentioned portfolio shift among private investors will have a much greater 
chance of being unleashed once the euro has confirmed its upward rebound.'" Many of the 
world's central banks may also be just waiting for the unexpected euro decline to reverse itself 
before beginning their 'euro-strengthening' reserve shift out of dollars and into euros.' The 
euro's coming rise is likely quite nigh. There is far more uncertainty with respect to its timing 
than to its likelihood. 
No wonder it has become an appealing policy agenda for the US to continué its long 
tradition of'benign neglect' toward the doUar's exchange rate. Stretching out the current period 
of dollar 'invulnerability' has become synonymous with shepherding the country's longest 
economic expansión on to even further record lengths, and nursing Wall Street's increasingly 
13. The serious prospect of exchange rate intervention by the world's major central banks to 
strengthen the euro could also end the dollar's current overvaluation. More on this in the 
foUowing section. 
14. See Fred Bergsten, "The Dollar and the Euro," Foreign Affairs, New York: July/August 
1997, pp.83-95 and "The Coming Rise of the Euro", Speech before the World Economic 
Forum, January 28, 2000 (http://www.iie.com/TESTIMONY/davo2000.htm). 
15. See Stephen Roach, economist for Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, "Alan Greenspan, Where 
Are You?" Global Economic Forum, October 14, 1999. (http://www.msdw.cotn/gef/) "Foreign 
investors have had it with the safe haven play on dollar-denominated assets. I have been 
overseas in four of the past five weeks - first two weeks in Europe and now two weeks in Asia. 
What a contrast between the view from afar and that at home. The eyes of US-based investors 
glaze over when you speak of the dollar and America's record-setting current account déficit. 
By contrast, foreign investors are all ears. Particularly noteworthy are the responses i have 
received from those charged with managing foreign exchange reserves. I have had many 
officials wam me of the coming asset allocation shift out of dollars and into euros. It hasn't 
happened yet, but they are certainly thinking about it. This was the shift that was supposed to 
have happened at the time of EMÚ launch. But the cyclical shortfall in Euroland activity and 
the related slippage of the euro, put it on hold. With Europe back on the mend and the ECB 
apparently about to spring into action by initiating its first monetary tightening cycle, that play 
now appears once again to be under active consideration out here in Asia. With Asian 
authorities collectively managing cióse to $650 billion in currency reserves - Japan, China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore combined ~ the implications of this asset allocation shift 
out of dollar-denominated assets should not be taken lightly. These guys are still overweight 
dollars, and believe me, virtually all are thinking about reducing their exposure to the world's 
largest intemational debtor." 
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vulnerable buU run, and maintaining the myth of pathologically dysfunctional and 
overregulated European economies. Henee, the 'euro-bashing' fashion - one trader was recently 
quoted referring to the euro as a 'trash currency' - in the US press. 
The dynamic - and therefore US national economic interests - may be changing, 
however. It appears that the Federal Reserve was flnally provoked into cooperating with the 
ECB and the Bank of Japan in last week's coordination exchange market intervention by the 
growing list of large US firms announcing wamings of lower than expected eamings as a result 
of pressures on their margins from a strong dollar squeezing foreign sales. Evidently, the Fed 
has decided that during the historically jittery month of October (which this year is also the 
final run-up to the US elections) - with equity markets already skidding sideways at best - there 
is more risk of a stock market correction being provoked by a slide in corporate eamings than 
by a depreciation of the dollar (whether managed by coordinated central bank intervention, or 
sparked by a speculative correction unprovoked by active intervention). 
2. THE CONFUSIÓN OVER EURO WEAKNESS 
Although the ECB has spent much time and effort attempting to claim that it does not 
target the exchange rate, it is ironic that it actually began raising interest rates in response to a 
sliding euro. The irony becomes more perverse when one realizes that the past five rate 
increases undertaken by the ECB (November, February, March, April and August) have all 
been followed by further slides in the currency's exchange rate. On the other hand, five of the 
six "rebounds" the currency has made since July 1999 (July, September/October, 
January,February/March, May and September) have followed closely upon aggressive 
comments from EU monetary doyens like Win Duisenberg, Otmar Issing, Christopher Noyer or 
Emst Welteke in their varied attempts to talk the currency up. It is as if the markets sometimes 
listen to the central bankers talking tough, but lose respect for them - and their currency - when 
they are forced to act on interest rates to defend the exchange rate". 
Some might take the ECB officials at their word. Interest rate increases, according to 
ECB spokesmen, have not been specifícally aimed at lifting the externa! valué of the currency 
(which, after all, should matter little to a monetary authority that has expressly chosen a flexible 
exchange rate regime) but rather at combating the potential inflationary effects of a declining 
euro. Assuming we are content with the level and intensity of the ECB's concern with inflation 
(relative to any ex-official concern it might have for grow^h and unemployment) then such an 
explanation should suffice. 
16. Of course, the most recent September recovery in the Euro's exchange rate is due to more 
than tough words; the point is that rate hikes have consistently been taken as a sign that the 
European growth cycle would continué to lag behind that of the US, leaving the closing of the 
growth differential hostage to the US growth rate. For the first 18 months of the euro's 'life' 
hawkish words from the European monetary authoríties had an effect; from now on words will 
need to be backed up by ECB intervention that does not put European growth rates at risk. 
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Strangely enough, however, the ironies continué. During the debate on the infamous 
Maastricht 'convergence criteria", one of the principal arguments in favor of a 'wide" euro 
(incorporating many European countries and transforming Europe into a reiatively 'large, 
closed' economy) was that it wouH both allow for a floating exchange rate and insulate Europe 
from extemal influences." The euro zone would be shieided from both externa! economic 
shocks (a typical problem of fixed exchange rates) and the destabilizing risks to investors 
implied by osciiiations in the currency's extemal valué (particularly acute under a flexible 
exchange rate regime when the economy in question is reiatively small and open). In this way 
the single currency might shelter Europe from volatility and uncertainty, making the monetary 
authority's job in overseeing growth with stable prices, much easier, just as the large, freely-
floating dollar has done for the US economy since the early 1970s. 
A mere 15% of the Euro zone's GDP is exposed to imports from the dollar zone, and 
much of this is accounted for by oil imports which as inputs would filter out much of the 
depreciation effect and prevent it from reaching end prices.'* As a result, the nearly 15% 
depreciation of the euro during its flrst year of life - and the 15% depreciation during 2000 -
should mean a surprisingly small contribution to European inflation rates. Indeed, 1999 
inflation should have included the effects of the euro's first year depreciation (as will as 
increasing oil prices), yet it remains at a mere 1.3 in August 1999). Euro depreciation would 
necessarily have to tum into a true free fall for its inflationary effects to become a serious 
concern - not the mere rhetorical 'free fall' referred to apocalyptically by financial joumalists 
whenever the euro's slide brings the new currency to yet another technically real, if artificial, 
'all-time low'. Indeed, looked at historically, according to Paul Chertkow, head of global 
currency research at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi in London, the euro has not yet reached its 
long-term low (exposing the shallowness of all the "all-time historie low" headline analysis 
which unduly distorts market perceptions toward the euro). The long-term trading range of the 
synthetic euro is between $1.70 (breached in December 1979) and $0.69 (reached February 
1985). As recently as September 1992 the euro currencies collectively stood at $1.55 and it was 
trading at $1.40 as recently August 1995, confirming what many would cali the inherent 
volatility of flexible exchange rates." 
17. This is also why Danish, Swedish and UK entry into the EMÚ are such important concems 
for the ECB and the EU at large. The 'wider' the euro, the less exposed to the extemal sector 
will be European growth and pnce levéis. The wider the euro, the less vulnerable - relative to 
the US economy - will be Europe to extemal influences and fluctuations in its exchange rate. 
18. The average of exports and imports - the standard measure of 'openness' - for the EU-11 as 
a percent of GDP is some 16%. This means the economy of the Euzo zone is much more 
mvulnerable to extemal shocks than were its constituent member economies, but it remains 
somewhat more open - and more vulnerable - than the US (12%) and Japan (11%) See "The 
International Role of the Euro," speech by Wim Duisenberg, president of the ECB, at the 2000 
Spruce Meadows Round Table, Calgary, September 8, 2000. 
19. Financial Times, May 4, 2000, p. 29. All other exchange rate data is from Datastream 
Online Services. 
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Nevertheless, despite rising headline figures, inflationary pressures in Europe retnain 
subdued. The most recent inflationary pressures have come from oil price rises which have once 
again begun to subside. Although the headline inflation rate in the Euro zone recentiy topped 
the 2% threshold -guarded over the médium run by the ECB like a bridge troll - the core rate 
(excluding energy pnces) has held steady throughout the summer at 1.3%. While the core rate -
much more important to the ECB as a signal of underlying price pressures - is expected to rise 
a bit further by the end of the year (perhaps to 1.5%) as higher energy prices feed further into 
the economy. But assuming oil prices do not continué rising from current levéis 
(US$30.00/bbl), there is everything reason to believe the statistical 'base effect' will bring 
headline rates of inflation down to below the middle run threshold of 2% next year (and perhaps 
to a level even below the core rate).'" In any event, it is very difficult to argüe that the declining 
euro, by itself, has generated much inflation at atl. Had not the latest oil price increase of the 
last year coincided with the euro's depreciation, the issue would not exist. 
During its first year of existence the ECB has had the admittedly tricky task of 
stimulating the sluggish core Euro zone economies - to avoid alienating the European public 
whose objections could easily push national govemments into public rows over Euro policy, 
thus 'spooking the markets' - while maintaining public respect for its currency. This has meant 
relatively loóse monetary conditions (real interest rates under 2% for much of the time, even if 
they are slightly higher now) while simultaneously attempting build ECB credentials - to 
satisfy the ubiquitous and all-powerful 'markets' - as a credible and reliable monetary authority 
capable of keeping inflation low and stable. This is not and will not be easy. The markets have 
known all along about the ECB's razor's edge dilemma and, when convenient, have often 
exploited it with bearish sentiment on the euro. 
But the Euro buUs' bad luck did stop there. Bom in the year in which the American 
economy became literally possessed by the Internet fever, the euro would inevitably suffer from 
the effect of Europe's newly respectable growth rates being overshadowed by the even brighter 
light of the US's 'new economy', Wall Street's TMT boom, and the long string of 'positive 
surprises' (by their very nature temporary, if surprisingly enduring, phenomena) coming from 
monthly releases of US economic data. Indeed, the most conventional analysis would not be 
surprised at all by the euro's depreciation, and ñor would it be overly concemed - at least not 
until speculative trading would seem to push the euro to within reach of its true 'all-time low" 
of US$0.69 (February 1985).'' 
The dominant - if suspect - opinión in the markets is that the Euro's current weakness 
has been driven not by speculation by rather by long-term capital flows. European firms have 
20. Because oil prices began rising most steeply beginning last summer, a mere levelling off a 
prices would produce smaller and smaller year-on-year percentage increases over time, as the 
broad range of consumer prices continué to rise from a larger 'base'. 
21. This is indeed where the euro seemed to be heading - reaching a low of US$0.8440 on 
Wednesday, September 20 - until the ECB intervened in the exchange markets in a coordinated 
action along with the Bank of Japan,- the US Federal Reserve and a number of other central 
banks on Friday, September 22, 2000. 
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gone a a buying spree in the US where they perceive retums to be higher over the médium and 
long term. According to Ben Funnell of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, in 1999 alone Euro zone 
companies were net buyers of $54bn worth of US companies in cash. The buoyancy and 
optimism of the US economy has only made this trend even stronger, as more $125bn in long-
term capital (FDl) flowed into the US from Europe in net terms from the euro's birth through to 
April 2000. Neverthless, the most recent figures show the net FDI inflows into the Euro zone in 
the first seven months of 2000 were €117.3bn. The markets, however, still seem entrenched in 
their view that the Euro zone is suffering from a chronic outflow of long-term capital, 
particularly to the US. The decline the 'basic balance' so often referred to recently by analysts 
arguing that the middle-term prospects for the Euro are less than rosy stems from the temporary 
and volatile oil price factor which has squeeze the Euro zone's current surplus and depressed 
the basic balance despite the notable improvement in long-term capital flows for Europe. But in 
the end, as is typical, it has been short-tenn liquid asset purchases, convenient for speculative 
purposes - despite many recent claims to the contrary - that have been powering the dollar/euro 
through its current overshoot. According to economists at Bear Stearns in London, in the first 
two months of this year, the net portfolio outflow from Euroland has zoomed up to €156.2bn, 
against only €17.5bn in the first two months of 1999. The net portfolio outflow by September 
had reached well over €200bn. At the margin, as always, the short-term outflows (ie, "hot 
money" or its liquid asset equivalen! in this age of footloose and free capital markets), not long-
term oriented FDI, have made the difference in the currency markets." 
Up until the big March/April TMT correction, many analysts believed that a strong 
drop in the Nasdaq, relative to European bourses, would push up the Euro. The problem with 
such a line of analysis, however - and, of course, the Spring 2000 performance of the euro 
bears this out - is that: 
(1) European stock markets have roughly followed the Nasdaq, both on the way 
up, and on the way down; and 
(2) If the Nasdaq has done relatively worse, the expected relative effect on the 
euro was nullified by the fact that the euro was already being pushed down by 
a speculative overshoot when the Nasdaq correction occurred. 
Investors pulling money out of the Nasdaq were not going to escape into European equities 
when they could see that European Índices (much more tech heavy than their Dow Jones 
counterpart, if less than the Nasdaq) were also falling in response. Even if the pan-European 
indexes were dropping relatively less spectacularly than the Nasdaq, investors still would not 
22. Adding to the string of ironies, over 65% of the net issuance of euro-denominated debt in 
1999 (a total €105.4bn) was undertaken by non-Euro zone residents (attracted to euro issuances 
by the rising network economies) who converting these euros back into their home currencies, 
creating heavy selling pressures on the European currency early on, while the actors purchasinfe 
these bonds tended to be Euro zone residents who did not need to buy the currency. This would, 
of course, however perversely, only add to Euro weakness. 
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put money there, particularly if the euro was depreciating rapidly at the time - as it was. Money 
temporarily fleeing out of the Nasdaq more likely went, if not into the oíd economy Dow 
stocks, then certainly into US paper. As we might expect long bond yields in the US have fallen 
faster than in Europe, as bond pnces have been pushed up. Many euro bulls, having remained 
overweight in the euro and maintaining the faith that the inevitable Nasdaq correction would 
provide the spark for their currency, then unwound their positions as they lost the faith and 
contributed to the speculative overshoot. 
Such a convergence of events, colliding with a brand new ECB trying to get on its feet 
and leam to walk the credibility tightrope, have laid the perfect seedbed for an extended Euro 
overshoot far below its fundamental valúes. Indeed, the consensus of opinión at the mid-April 
meetings of the G-7 and the IMF in Washington was that the euro was undervalued by 
approximately 20%-30% against the doUar. This diagnosis was reiterated at the lastest G-7 
meeting on Saturday, September 23, the day foUowing the ECB first coordinated intervention. 
That the euro's decline no longer has much to do with fundamentáis has become 
something of a mantra for European policymakers. While traders in the exchange markets have 
tended to interepret this as a cover for weakness, Europe's policy-makers are nevertheless 
correct about this. The euro's extended drop below parity with the doUar has been a classic 
speculative overshoot. We should pay little attention to the self-interested tales from the 'herds' 
of fínancial joumalists and analysts who try to tell us that euro weakness is due to of a lack of 
'structural reform' in Europe. Even the Bundesbank, one of the most hawkish European 
institutions on issues of economic reform - has recently argued that structural refomis have 
been taking place in Europe at the most intense pace in recent memory. The euro has continued 
to depreciate simply because investors have seen the euro depreciation - the real factors 
actually become secondary issues to those who most directly influence the short run exchange 
rate - and now seem inclined to bet that that sude will continué. On the other hand', the plethora 
of voices speaking out on the euro's exchange rate, often in a way which could easily be 
perceived as contradictory or vacillating, has certainly helped fuel the euro's decline. 
Such speculative dynamics can be undermined and reversed by one of two factors: 
(1) A change in ECB policy - or a change in the market's perception of ECB 
policy. A broad floor could be placed under the euro by ECB interventions, 
stimulating speculation to change its direction to become a 'stabilizing' 
influence. Much of the aggressive central bank and fmance ministry rhetoric 
in May and June was meant to créate the perception that such intervention 
might easily take place.^ ' 
23. Such 'dirty float' interventions are standard practices in the event of extreme currency 
movements, whatever the rhetoric of fmance ministries or newspapers might have to say about 
them. The US has used such techniques at least twice in the 1990s to modérate extreme dollar 
fluctuations against the Japanese yen (once in 1995 and again in 1998). The most recent 
coordinated intervention of September 2000 is of the same nature. It should be noted that there 
is often a time lag before the effects on the exchange rate become clearly evident. 
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(2) A narrowing in the transatlantic growth rate and interest rate differentiais and 
a corresponding string of 'negatively surprises' from US growth rate 
c- 24 
figures. 
Until recently, the ECB seemed loathe to let the markets perceive any standard attempt to 
defend the euro, even if this has become the most accurate way to describe the central bank's 
actual behavior. After all, four of the last five rate increases in Europe have closely followed 
significant slides in the euro's exchange rate.^ ^ For supposedly being unconcemed about the 
extemal valué of the euro, the ECB certainly seems to be overly concemed about just that. 
Nevertheless, ECB rate increases, far from stemming the euro's slides, have actually 
exacerbated them, as the markets have tossed aside the traditional interest rate differential as the 
primary guide to their exchange rate movements and instead concentrated on the momentum of 
markets and asset prices, thus placing much more emphasis on perceived growth rate 
differentiais and expected exchange rate movements. Only recently, as concems have arisen as 
to the sustainability of the European growth cycle, has the ECB, in its opaque way, 
communicated a change in its strategy, away from interest rate defense of the currency to direct 
market intervention. 
3. CURRENCY POLITICS AND EXCHANGE RA TES 
But why should it matter that the euro has slumped against the dollar? The weaker 
Euro has helped stimulate European growth and has not yet proven inflationary, ai! the press 
frenzy on euro weakness and the overly conservative rhetoric of central banks, notwithstanding. 
The Bundesbank recently weighed into this confusing debate. Their spokesman have 
attempted to refute the contention - brandished by continental EU politicians like Schroder in 
public defense of the single currency project - that the weakening euro helps stimulate 
Euroland exports and job creation, particularly in the 'core economies' like Germany and Italy, 
more dependent on exports beyond the euro zone. In this Bundesbank versión of the argument, 
24. This is indeed what appears to be finally happening. The recent OECD report waming of 
overheating and a resulting hard landing in the US sparked fears that the Fed would necessarily 
continué to raise rates to avoid such a prospect. (Financial Times, June 5, 2000, p.l). That 
report however was quickly followed by new 'softer' economic data out of the US which 
seemed to convince the markets that the Fed's recent rate increases have successfully cooled the 
economy enough to avoid the need to continué hiking interest rates as aggressively as 
previously anticipated (FT June 7, 2000, p.35). The market consensus is also now expecting a 
significantly softer 3Q00 GDP figure from the US on October 27: this would be the most 
significant sign of the slowdown in the US economy. 
25. And the ECB's fífth rate increase - +50bp from 3.75% to 4.25% on June 8, 2000 - was 
twice as high as the expectations of the market consensus and is widely believed to have been 
partially aimed at Consolidated the euro's late May-early June rally to above $0.95/€. 
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Euro zone exports are too small in relation to GDP for a depreciating currency to make a 
relevant impact on aggregate demand. According to the Schroder versión of the argument, 
however, a weakening euro provides a loosening supplement to conventional monetary policy. 
Not surprisingly, such insinuations have made the Bundesbank uneasy, pushing it to argüe that 
a weaker euro is indeed an inflationary danger (and by extensión essentially agreeing with 
Schroder but shifting the nature of the controversy to one of relative priorities between growth 
and stable prices). But the Bundesbank - and everybody else trying to stand on this conceptual 
fence - cannot have their cake and eat it too. Either the Euroland's exposure to intemational 
trade is large enough to significantly effect output and prices, or it is not. 
One of the primary arguments in favor of a 'wide' continental currency, it shouid be 
recalled, was that it would make a floating exchange rate regime more viable for European 
economies, as it would reduce the percentage exposure of the domestic price level to exchange 
rate movements via intemational trade and investment links. After all, West Germán mark 
'weakness' was even more pronounced in the 1980s when its extemal exposure was much 
higher. Germany is thus presumably better off now with the euro and - given sluggish Germán 
growth rates and high unemployment in the mid-1990s - particularly if it is weak vis-á-vis the 
dollar and the yen. Nevertheless, even if euro weakness is considered potentially inflationary, 
euro depreciation shouid be welcomed for its stimulating effects until it clearly threatens to 
become inflationary. 
But why not let the euro drop as the markets would have it, overshoot or no? Such a 
development would continué to stimulate the existing real economy in Europe, improving still 
further the environment in which 'structural reforms' - about which the fmancial press will not 
stop harping, and which certain politicians and corporate leaders (and not necessarily European) 
silently anticipate with reiish - could proceed. Why not accept euro weakness now as the 
necessary pre-requisite for euro strength in the future? The longer the euro contributes to faster 
growth in the relatively sluggish Euroland core, the more time politicians have to push through 
tough-to-swallow structural reforms during relatively good times. When the euro finally 
rebounds, and perhaps overshoots on the upside, the exchange rate will, if anything, be 
contributing to tighter monetary conditions on the continent, injecting contractionary pressures 
into the European economy, and souring the atmosphere for further reform. 
Until the September slump below US$0.90, which threatened to gather speculative 
momentum and breach the US$0.80 threshold, euro depreciation presented a problem only in 
terms of misguided perceptions and misplaced pride, while the real economy in Europe 
gathered momentum. In the final analysis, the only thing we had to fear from euro weakness 
was fear itself - meaning a speculative and then panic run on the euro which might provoke 
arbitrary and unanticipated policy responses. In such a rarified environment of a speculative 
run, comments like those made by Alfred Broaddus of the Richmond Branch of the US Federal 
Reserve - to the effect that the current Euro weakness was bringing into question the entire 
future viability of the single currency - have the power to genérate powerfiíl one-way 
speculative moves, particularly against the backdrop of a market nearly convinced of American 
benign neglect and of 'No' vote at the Danish Euro referendum. 
An overvalued euro, on the other hand, would genérate real opposition in Europe as 
the tough exchange rate begins to throw down the breaks on Europe's long awaited economic 
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take-off. Whether the real danger presented by euro weakness is infiation or just fear and the 
unpredictable over-reactions it might provoke, not many in Europe would complain about a 
euro rebound now, even if ECB intervention were required to unleash it. 
Still, there is no clear consensus on whether or not exchange rate intervention would 
be effective at stemming the tide of a Euro slide, particularly given the market myth that the 
Euro's most recent slides still reflect the outflow of long-term investment to the economic 
nirvana of the United States. Nevertheless, coordinated intervention proved to be at least an 
essential catalyst to exchange rate realignment in the 1980s, the last period of extended upside 
dollar overshoot. Even the threat of central bank intervention can effect perceptions and tum 
speculative sentiment in the opposite direction once a currency has remained for an appreciable 
period time with a significant overshoot. The only real question is whether US Fed and 
Treasury cooperation would prove essential. This question then quickly boils down into 
another: Why would the Americans resist? 
Until the coordinated intervention in the exchange markets on Friday, September 22, 
the consensus of opinión did not believe that American monetary authorities would support an 
intervention in defense of the euro. The argument was that deliberately weakening the dollar 
would inject extra inflationary pressure into the American economy precisely at the moment 
that underlying infiation is beginning to rise, placing even yet more pressure on the Fed to 
continué raising rates. Deliberately undermining dollar strength - now something of a tótem of 
resurgent American national pride - during the home stretch of the presidential eiection 
campaign, and pushing the Fed toward an even more aggressive contractionary stance would 
aliénate voters and risk a severe stock market correction, a 'hard landing' and a significant 
dollar slide before the November elections.^' 
Such a scenario would obviously not be welcomed by the Democrats (the White House 
incumbents), but neither would it be celebrated by the Republicans, whose advocacy of free and 
unfettered capital markets would be somewhat discredited by a crash on Wall Street and a new 
recession. While the Republicans might be the beneficiaries of such a scenario in the race for 
the White House, they would likely suffer a setback in the House of Representatives as a result, 
and perhaps even in the Senate, as the bust would renew pre-election calis for the kind of 
regulation and oversight that Democrats are always more comfortable in advocating. Treasury 
Secretary Larry Summers repeated statements during September that the US 'strong dollar 
policy' remained unchanged helped to convince the markets that the US would not coUaborate 
26. Some observers view this correction as nearly inevitable. See for example William Greider, 
"Greenspan and Gravity", The Nation. January 24, 2000, and "Shopping Till We Drop", The 
Nation. April 10, 2000. Greider points out in the fírst article that at the end of 1999 the US 
financial system was put on Standard &Poor's 'watch list' of twenty countries that are 
"vulnerable to a credit bust", while in the second piece he states that the country's net debtor 
position has grown in less than 15 years from being nil to over 20% of the current GDP. "If the 
music stops and the foreign money rushes home," Greider writes, pointing out the obvious, 
"Icarus will land with a thud." 
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with the ECB in an intervention to prop up the Euro and perhaps retum the trans-Atlantic 
exchange to levéis closer to its mid-term equilibrium. 
Even if a strong dollar does help the Fed inject a bit of short-term contractionary 
pressures into the American economy (although the strong dollar clearly has not been able to 
effectively substitute for this year's Fed tightening), the real danger to the stability of US output 
and pnces is not the Euro, but rather the doUar's relationship with the yen. The doUar's fall 
against the yen has mirrored its appreciation against the euro and has already injected far more 
inflationary pressures to the US economy than would come from a dollar/euro realignment. 
Henee, there is no valid economic reason for resisting exchange rate collaboration with the 
Europeans, particularly if it is combined with coordinated intervention with the Japanese on the 
yen in the opposite direction, (ie, strengthening the dollar against the yen). 
Given the approaching election, and the attitude of American officials toward the 
strong dollar, the September 22 coordinated intervention took everybody by surprise. Two 
schools of thought developed to explain the surprise US participation. The first explanation 
focuses on the recent string of profit wamings by large US firms who claim to be suffering from 
the overly strong dollar. Perhaps the Administration feared the possibility of stock market 
collapse in the traditionally jittery month of October provoked by a squeeze on corporate profits 
from the effects of a strong dollar more than it feared a stock market crash provoked by a 
market-driven correction of the dollar against the Euro. The other school of thought, while not 
at odds with the first, would claim further that the intentions of the US Treasury department 
were just that - to set minds to rest by capping the dollar's rise, but not to engineer a 
depreciation of the dollar. Summers' post-intervention comments claiming that the strong dollar 
policy remained intact despite the intervention strengthened this point of view. At best the US 
will cooperate with the Europeans to stem the slide in the Euro, but not to reverse the exchange 
rate trend. This would only happen after the elections, and the possibilities for such a change in 
dollar policy would be enhanced by a Gore victory but not necessarily ensured by it. 
Still, the November elections provide us with the most obvious short-term explanation 
for what appear to be a continued policy 'benign neglect' toward the dollar's overshoot. The 
most likely middle term explanation for American intransigence on currency policy is that the 
dollar/euro exchange rate, together with all the accompanying commentaries and press debates, 
has become the convenient battleground for American and European egos and ideologies 
(however unconscious or infantile). In the end, for the worid's media consumers, the strong 
dollar has come to represen! the superiority of the so-called 'American model' - a more 
unrestrained, footloose versión of laissez faire capitalism - while the euro represents the 
possibility of sustaining some kind of welfare state, however much it must be streamiined to 
successfully withstand the forces of globalization. In other words, the short-run evolution of the 
dollar/euro exchange rate now functions as the sublimated expression of the survival struggle of 
a modified versión of the 'European model' - which the rest of the world might be interested in 
27. The combined Euro purchases by the Fed and the Treasury are now believed to have 
reached $1.34billion, over 30% more than analysts had originally estimated. 
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considering - in the face of the outright hostility of the American financial élite and, one might 
add, its allies in Europe and around the world. 
